Abstract-In this paper, we investigate a practical demand side management scenario where the selfish consumers compete to minimize their individual energy cost through scheduling their future energy consumption profiles. We propose an instantaneous load billing scheme to effectively convince the consumers to shift their peak-time consumption and to fairly charge the consumers for their energy consumption. For the considered DSM scenario, an aggregative game is first formulated to model the strategic behaviors of the selfish consumers. By resorting to the variational inequality theory, we analyze the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the formulated game. Subsequently, for the scenario where there is a central unit calculating and sending the real-time aggregated load to all consumers, we develop a one timescale distributed iterative proximal-point algorithm with provable convergence to achieve the NE of the formulated game. Finally, considering the alternative situation where the central unit does not exist, but the consumers are connected and they would like to share their estimated information with others, we present a distributed agreement-based algorithm, by which the consumers can achieve the NE of the formulated game through exchanging information with their immediate neighbors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, demand side management (DSM) has emerged as one of the key techniques to transform today's aging power grid into a more efficiently and more reliably operated smart grid [1] , [2] . Thanks to the two-way communication capabilities of smart grid, real-time pricing [3] has been regarded as a promising technique to implement DSM due to its ability to effectively convince consumers to shift their peak-time energy consumption to non-peak time. In real-time pricing schemes, the energy price for a certain operation period is normally designed to be proportional to the aggregated load of all consumers during the considered period [3] - [6] . As a result, the consumers would prefer to consume more energy during non-peak times rather than peak times in order to decrease their energy cost. This can improve the operation efficiency of the whole grid since its demand is flattened.
In a real-time pricing based DSM framework, the billing mechanism (i.e., how to charge the consumers for their energy usage) is of great importance since it may significantly affect the consumers' motivation to participate in the DSM program. However, there has only been limited work investigating this important billing issue. [4] proposed a simple billing approach, where the consumers were charged in proportional to their total energy consumption for the next operation period. This total load billing method can minimize the whole grid energy cost. However, the consumers are charged the same amount if they consume the same total amount of electricity, regardless in peak or off-peak times, which leads to unfair charging for the consumers who use less electricity in peak times. To address this problem, Baharlouei et al. proposed a new billing scheme in [5] , where each consumer is charged based on his/her instantaneous load in each time slot during the next operation period. As a result, the consumers will be charged more if they consume more during peak times and this can effectively improve the fairness of charging between different consumers [5] . [6] applied the same billing mechanism and developed a classical non-cooperative game for the DSM scenario where the traditional consumers as well as consumers owing distributed energy sources and/or energy storage compete to reduce their energy bills. However, the main analysis and results in [5] , [6] are only valid when the energy price is a linear function of the total load of all consumers in each time slot. Moreover, the energy price in a practical grid may not necessarily be a linear function, and thus the approach developed in [5] , [6] may not be applicable in these scenarios.
In this paper, we develop a general and practical DSM framework to enable the selfish consumers to optimize their own energy payment through scheduling their future energy consumption. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) Inspired by [4] - [6] , we propose an instantaneous load billing scheme to effectively convince the consumers to shift their peak-time energy consumption and fairly charge the consumers, where the energy price of a certain time duration is designed as an increasing and general polynomial function of the total load in that duration, and the consumers are charged based on the instantaneous energy price as well as the amount of energy consumption in each time duration. The billing method in [5] , [6] can thus be regarded as a special case of our proposed one. (2) By exploring the aggregative property of the proposed billing mechanism that the energy cost of each consumer only depends on its own and all consumers' aggregated energy consumption profiles, we develop a novel aggregative game 1 to model the strategic behaviors of the selfish consumers. Additionally, we perform new theoretical analysis for the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the formulated game. This analysis will be facilitated by using advanced variational inequality theory [10] . The formulation of the aggregative game enables us to develop two new distributed algorithms to achieve the NE of the formulated game for the scenarios with or without a central unit broadcasting the real-time aggregated load to consumers. (3) Following the same setting with [6] where a cental unit exists and broadcasts the real-time aggregated energy consumption profile to all consumers, we provide a distributed iterative proximal-point algorithm to achieve the NE of the formulated game. In this algorithm, all the consumers update their energy consumption profiles in a parallel manner. This is in contrast to the conventional sequential algorithm approach (see e.g. [4, Algorithm 1]), where the updates of the consumers occur sequentially (i.e., one consumer after the other). If the number of consumers is large, the sequential algorithm will take many iterations to converge and will be difficult to implement in practice. In addition, the only required information for the updates of this algorithm is the aggregated energy consumption profile of all consumers in the previous iteration instead of the profile of an individual consumer. This can effectively protect the privacy of the consumers. Furthermore, this algorithm is a one timescale algorithm and the choice of algorithm parameters does not depend on the system arguments. This is contrast to the proximal decomposition algorithm proposed in [6] , which is also a parallel but two timescale algorithm, and is generally harder to implement in online settings [11] . Also, the regulation parameter of the algorithm in [6] has to be chosen centrally since it is normally dependent on the system arguments, which may limit the scalability of these algorithms. (4) Considering the alternative situation where the central unit does not exist, but the consumers are connected and they would like to share their estimated information with others, we present a distributed agreement-based algorithm, by which the consumers can achieve the NE of the formulated game through exchanging information with their immediate neighbors. Although information exchanges are required between the consumers in this algorithm, no private information (e.g., the exact energy consumption profile of each consumer) is shared between the consumers, thus effectively protecting the consumers' privacy. Moreover, the consumers update their energy consumption profile simultaneously in the developed algorithm, which makes the algorithm converge quickly. Finally, the parameters of this algorithm can also be chosen without knowing the system's arguments a priori.
Notations: All the vectors, except as specially stated, are column vectors. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an electricity network comprised of N consumers, which are served by a common energy provider. We denote the set of these consumers as N = {1, . . . , N }. Each consumer is equipped with an energy management controller unit, which has full responsibility for scheduling the consumer's energy consumption. In addition, there exists a two-way communications network connecting each consumer to the energy provider. Similar to [4] , [12] , we assume that the energy requirement of each consumer is determined in advance for H future time slots. Each time slot can represent different timing horizons, e.g., one hour of a day.
A. Energy Consumption Model
We consider an energy consumption model as in [12] , where the nth (n ∈ N ) consumer's energy consumption profile can be formulated as
where q h n is the energy consumption of consumer n in the hth time slot and it is subject to the following constraints:
where q h,min n and q h,max n denote consumer n's minimum and maximum energy levels 2 in time slot h, respectively, and E n is the minimum total energy requirement of consumer n over all time slots. Therefore, the individual feasible energy consumption set of consumer n can be expressed as
where H = {1, . . . , H} is the set of all future H time slots. The feasible energy consumption set of all consumers can thus be expressed as
B. Instantaneous Load Billing
To effectively convince the consumers to shift their peaktime energy consumption and fairly charge the consumers for their energy consumption, we propose an instantaneous load billing scheme, where the energy price (the cost of one unit energy) of a certain time slot is set as an increasing function of the total demand in that time slot, and the consumers are charged based on the instantaneous energy price as well as the energy amount they consume in each time slot. Inspired by the spot market price model adopted in [13] , [14] , we use 2 Note that the minimum and maximum energy levels can be estimated in practice by sophisticated predictive techniques, such as machine learning and stochastic signal processing [12] . Moreover, the approaches presented in this work can be easily extended to the appliance-level energy consumption model [4] .
the following general polynomial function to model the energy price of the hth time slot:
where a h , b h , c h are time slot-specific parameters with
, and L h is the total energy consumed by all consumers in time slot h. It is worthwhile noting that the price function in (5) can readily account for the important characteristics of energy prices that are needed for DSM in smart grid. For example, the increasing and convex price function ensures that the energy price will grow more rapidly as the aggregated load increases. This can effectively convince the consumers to shift their peak-time consumption to non-peak hours. Additionally, the billing approach adopted in [5] , [6] can be regarded as a special case of the proposed scheme. Follow the proposed energy price model, the total energy cost for consumer n over all future H time slots can thus be given by:
where
,m =n denotes the (N − 1)H × 1vector of all consumers' energy consumption profiles, except the nth one.
Note that (6) can be further rewritten as
where q Σ = N m=1 q m denotes the aggregated energy consumption profile of all consumers over future H time slots and q h Σ = N m=1 q h m is the hth element of q Σ . From (7), we can see that the calculation of the total energy cost of each consumer only requires the knowledge of the aggregated energy consumption profile of all consumers (q Σ ), and that the individual consumption profile of each consumer (q −n ) is not required any more.
III. GAME FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we formulate an aggregative game for the considered DSM scenario. By employing variational inequality theory, we then analyze the existence and uniqueness of the NE for the formulated aggregative game.
A. Aggregative Game Formulation
We consider the scenario where all consumers are selfish. In particular, each consumer aims to minimize his/her total cost through energy consumption scheduling. Mathematically, this will involve the nth consumer (n ∈ N ) solving the following optimization problem:
We can observe from (8) that the consumers solve optimization problems which are coupled with the aggregated energy consumption of all consumers. Hence, this energy consumption control scenario can be modeled by the following aggregative game [7] , [8] [9, Ch. 4]:
• Players: The N consumers.
• Actions: Each consumer selects its energy consumption q n ∈ Q n to minimize his/her total energy cost.
• Payoffs: The total energy cost B n (q n , q Σ ) defined in (7) . For convenience, we denote this Nash equilibrium (NE) problem as G = N , {Q n } , {B n (q n , q Σ )} . In the following subsection, we will employ variational inequality theory [10] to analyze the formulated game.
B. NE Analysis
Before proceeding, it is convenient to first present the following lemma regarding the properties of the formulated game's action sets and payoff functions:
Lemma 1: For each n = 1, . . . , N , the set Q n ∈ R H is convex and compact, and each function B n (q n , q Σ ) is continuously differentiable in q n . For each n ∈ N and each fixed tuple q −n , the function B n · , · + N m=1,m =n q m is convex in q n over the set Q n .
Proof: See Appendix A. Under Lemma 1 and according to [10, Prop. 1 
.4.2], we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2: The NE of the formulated game G is equivalent to the solution of the variational inequality (VI) problem 3 denoted by VI(Q, F) where Q = Q 1 × . . . × Q N and
with
By investigating the monotonicity property of the mapping F (q), we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1: If the price parameter b h satisfies b h < 3 + 4/ (N − 1) for any h ∈ H, then the formulated aggregative game admits a unique NE.
Proof: See Appendix B. One could consider to solve the aforementioned game in a centralized manner, where a central unit adopts the algorithms proposed in [10, Ch. 12 ] to solve the associated VI problem. However, such an approach requires each consumer to release detailed information about their energy consumption feasible set, which may lead to consumers' privacy and security concerns. To overcome this issue, in the following sections, we will develop two different distributed algorithms to achieve the NE of the formulated aggregative game for the scenarios with and without a central unit, which calculates the aggregated load and broadcasts it to consumers in each iteration of the algorithm. 
3.3: Send the update qn(t + 1) to the central unit. 4 : t ← t + 1; go to STEP 2.
IV. DISTRIBUTED ITERATIVE PROXIMAL-POINT ALGORITHM WITH A CENTRAL UNIT
In this section, we consider the same setting as [6] where there is a cental unit, which can provide the consumers with the latest information of the aggregated energy consumption profile after all consumers update their individual ones. In this case, we develop a distributed iterative Proximal-point algorithm to achieve the NE of the formulated aggregative game.
Before presenting our algorithm, it is worth mentioning that the formulated game can also be solved by [6, Algorithm 1], which was guaranteed to converge under some conditions on the algorithm parameters. The distributed algorithm in [6] was proposed based on the proximal decomposition method [15] and solved a sequence of regulated versions of the original problem, each of which may need a distributed iterative process in itself. This is actually a two timescale approach (i.e., the proximal method updates at a slower timescale while solutions of the regularized problems change at a faster timescale) and is generally harder to implement in online settings [11] . Additionally, the regulation parameter of such kind of algorithms has to be chosen centrally since it is normally dependent on the system arguments, which may limit the scalability of these algorithms. To overcome these shortcomings, we present a single timescale distributed algorithm based on the iterative regulation technique [11] , [16] , which requires only one projection step in each iteration. This algorithm is formally described in Algorithm 1.
The convergence property of Algorithm 1 is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Assume that the price parameter b h satisfies b h < 3 + 4/ (N − 1) for ∀h ∈ H. Then, the sequence of the energy consumption profile {q(t)} generated by Algorithm 1 converges to the unique NE of the game G if the step-size γ(t) satisfies the following:
Proof: See Appendix C. As shown above, Algorithm 1 can converge to the NE of the formulated game when there is a central unit that calculates A n (0) = qn (0) for every n ∈ N . Given the weight parameters w n,k and the step-size α (t). 2: If a suitable termination criterion is satisfied: STOP. 3: Each consumer n ∈ N update its energy consumption profile and the estimated average energy consumption of all consumers via executingq A n (t) = wn,nq
4: t ← t + 1; go to STEP 2. the aggregated energy consumption profile q Σ and broadcasts it to all consumers in each iteration. However, the developed Algorithm 1 and the algorithm in [6] cannot be directly implemented for situations where the central unit does not exist, in which case the consumers thus do not have ready access to the aggregated energy consumption profile. Motivated by this issue, we will develop a distributed agreement-based algorithm to achieve the NE of the formulated game in the next section.
V. DISTRIBUTED AGREEMENT-BASED ALGORITHM
WITHOUT A CENTRAL UNIT In this section, we consider an alternative scenario where the central unit does not exist, but the consumers are connected in some manner and they are willing to share their estimated information through local communication. For this setting, we develop a distributed agrement-based algorithm, through which the consumers can achieve the NE of the game G through exchanging information with their immediate neighbors.
Recall that, in the formulated aggregative game, each consumer's payoff is only determined by his/her own energy consumption profile and the aggregated energy consumption profile of all consumers. Hence, the unique NE of the formulated game is achieved when the consumers reach an agreement (consensus) on the aggregated energy consumption profile. Following this equivalence and inspired by [9, Ch. 4], we develop a distributed agreement-based algorithm to achieve the unique NE of the considered aggregative game. In each iteration of this algorithm, each consumer n ∈ N executes the following three steps: The first step is to estimate the average energy consumption of all consumers through a weighted combination of his/her own estimation and the estimation of the immediate neighbors in the last iteration. We useq A n (t) to denote the average energy consumption of all consumers estimated by the consumer n in the tth iteration. Then, the aggregated load of the whole network estimated by consumer n is Nq A n (t). The second step is to update his/her energy consumption profile based on the estimated aggregated load through executing a Euclidean projection step. Finally, his/her own estimation of the average energy consumption is updated in the third step.
To proceed, it is convenient to first model the connection topology between consumers. For simplicity but without loss of generality, we model the connection topology of the consumers as an undirected static graph M (N , E) with N being the set of all consumers and E being the set of undirected edges among the consumers. The notation {n, k} ∈ E means that consumer n and consumer k are immediate neighbors, and D n denotes the set of consumer n's neighbors, i.e., D n = { k ∈ N | {k, n} ∈ E}. Now we are ready to present the distributed agreement-based algorithm, which is formally described in Algorithm 2, where the notation w n,k denotes the nonnegative weight that consumer n assigns to estimate of the consumer k, which is set to zero if k / ∈ D n and n = k. In terms of the convergence of Algorithm 2, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Assume that the undirected graph M (N , E) is connected, the step-size {α(t)} is monotonically decreasing with t and satisfies the following:
and the weights adopted by the consumers meets the following:
w n,k = 1, ∀n, and
Then the sequence {q(t)} generated by Algorithm 2 converges to the unique NE of the formulated game G.
Proof: See Appendix D. Remark 1: In this paper, we use the following formula for the weights [9, Ch. 4]:
where |D n | denotes the cardinality of the set D n , and 0 < τ < 1 is used to measure the relative proportion of the neighbors' estimates in each consumer's estimation of the average energy consumption. It is straightforward to validate that the weight in (14) satisfies the conditions the (13) . Other choices of the weights can be found in [17] .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some numerical results to validate the above theoretical analysis and illustrate the performance of the developed algorithms.
In the following simulation results, we consider the residential scenario consisting of N = 50 consumers, where the consumers determine their energy consumption for the following whole day. Each time slot is set as one hour, i.e., H = 24. In Fig. 1 [19] . Considering that different consumers may have different energy consumption interval in practice, the 'Low limit' and 'Upper limit' of each consumer in each time slot are formed by respectively adding a random real number to the corresponding value in Fig. 1 . Then, the initial energy consumption of a certain consumer in each time slot, q h n (0), is uniformly chosen between his/her corresponding 'Low limit' and 'Upper limit'. In the considered DSM scenario, the value q h,min n for the nth consumer is set to his/her 'Low limit' of the hth time slot. In addition, q h,max n for each time slot are set to his/her maximum value of the 'Upper limit'. The value of E n is chosen to be equal to the sum of the consumer's initial energy consumption profile before applying the DSM program. According to Fig.  1 , we classify the whole time horizon into three segments: off-peak hours (12am to 7am), mid-peak hours (7am to 4pm and 10pm to 12am), and on-peak hours (4pm to 10pm). We also set a h to 0.001, 0.0015 and 0.002 for the off-peak, midpeak and on-peak hours, respectively, and parameters b h and c h are set to 1.2 and 0 for ∀h ∈ H, respectively. Moreover, the parameters for the algorithms are chosen 4 as follows: γ (t) = (t + 1) −0.51 and θ = 0.2 for Algorithm 1, and α (t) = (t + 1) −0.51 and τ = 0.5 for Algorithm 2. Finally, a randomly generated connection structure of the consumers for Algorithm 2 are given in Fig. 2 , where two consumers are directly linked means that they are immediate neighbors, who can exchange information in each iteration of the algorithm. Fig. 3 plots the total energy cost for three different consumers versus the number of iterations of the developed algorithms. It can be observed from consumer has already achieved a relatively stable state after the first 20 iterations, which verifies the validness of both Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, as well as displaying the high efficiency of the developed algorithms. In Fig 4, we compare the energy consumption profiles of three different consumers corresponding to the situations before and after DSM program. We clearly observe from Fig. 4 that for all three consumers, the proposed DSM scheme effectively encourages the consumers to shift their energy consumption from peak to non-peak hours, which will not only reduce the consumers' energy cost but also benefit the efficiency of the whole power grid. In Fig. 5 , three consumers' estimations for the aggregated load of the 10th time slot is plotted against the iteration of the algorithm. From Fig. 5 , we can see that the estimations are largely diverse at the beginning of the algorithm but gradually converge to the same value, which validates our hypothesis of the equivalence between the seeking of the NE for the formulated game and the procedure that all consumers reach an agreement on the aggregated energy consumption profile. Finally, note that due to space limitations, we only show results in Figs. 3-5 for three randomly selected consumers, although it can be shown that similar results also hold for the other consumers and a wide range of settings with different parameters. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we formulated an aggregative game for the instantaneous load billing based demand side management program, where the consumers are selfish and compete to minimize their individual energy cost. The sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium (NE) of the formulated game was subsequently given and proved. Based on the formulation of aggregative game, we developed two distributed algorithms to find the NE of the formulated game, corresponding to the two scenarios where the consumers can or cannot access the information of the aggregated load. In these two algorithms, all the consumers update their energy consumption profile in a parallel manner and the choice for the algorithm parameters do not depend the arguments of the system. Numerical results showed that the developed algorithms can quickly converge to the NE of the formulated game and efficiently convince the consumers to shift their onpeak consumption, which are beneficial to both the consumers and the whole grid.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 1
It is evident that the statements in the first part of Lemma 1 holds. Hence, we only need to prove the convexity of B n · , · + N m=1,m =n q m in q n for every fixed q −n . This can be achieved by proving that the Hessian of B n (q n , q Σ ) is positive semidefinite [20] . After some algebraic manipulation, we have
Since (15) is a diagonal matrix with all diagonal elements being positive, the Hessian matrix of B n (q n , q −n ) is positive semidefinite. This completes the proof.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Based on Lemma 2, the proof of this proposition follows if we can show that the formulated VI(Q, F) 5 over Q since the feasible set Q is compact and convex.
To prove the strong monotonicity of the mapping F (q), it suffices to show that there exists a constant c sm > 0 such that J q F(q) − c sm I is positive semi-definite for any q ∈ Q [15, Sec. 4.2.3], where J q F(q) and I denote the Jacobian matrix of F(q) and the identity matrix of appropriate dimension, respectively. This is equivalent to showing that all the eigenvalues of the transpose of J q F(q) − c sm I, denoted by ∇ q F (q) − c sm I, are greater or equal to zero.
To proceed, we define
After some algebraic manipulation, we can see that the matrices ∇ q F (q)−c sm I and ∇ q Γ (q)−c sm I actually possess the same definite property. Therefore, the remaining of this proof is to show that all the eigenvalues of ∇ q Γ (q) − c sm I are no less than zero.
Based on (16), we can write ∇ q Γ (q) − c sm I as
where the block diagonal structure appears since the price functions of different timeslots are independent.
According to the property of block diagonal matrices, the positive semi-definiteness of matrix ∇ q Γ (q) − c sm I follows if each block matrix
The (n, m)th entry of G h (l h ) after some algebraic manipulation are given by
Since the matrix G h (l h ) may not be symmetric, we can prove its positive definiteness by showing that the symmetric matrix
is positive semi-definite [22] , where z h = q h Σ 1 + (b h − 1) l h , 1 is a N × 1 vector with every element of 1. This is equivalent to showing that the smallest eigenvalue of this matrix is nonnegative.
After some appropriate calculations [22] , the two non-zero eigenvalues of the matrix T b in (20) are given by
5 A mapping F (x): K ∋ x → R N is said to be strongly monotone on K if there exists a constant csm > 0 such that (x − y)
T (F (x) − F (y)) ≥ csm x − y 2 2 for all x, y ∈ K.
Since η
, the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix G h (l h ) + G h (l h )
T can be expressed as 
Substituting (23) into (22), we obtain
where κ h = (N + 1+b h ) − N N − 1 + (b h ) 2 .
Since σ h > 0, we observe from the right hand side of (23) that there exists a positive constant c sm such that η min ≥ 0 if κ h > 0, which is equivalent to the following condition
This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof for the convergence of a general iterative proximal-point algorithm and the corresponding necessary conditions were presented in [16, Sec. 3] . Therefore, we only need to prove that the formulated NEP G λ λ λ meets all the required conditions listed in [16, Assumption (A3)].
Firstly, it is evident that the set Q is compact, and that q 2 and F (q) 2 are both bounded for ∀q ∈ Q. Secondly, as we have proved in Appendix B, the mapping F (q) is strongly (strictly 6 ) monotone on q when the price parameter b h satisfies b h < 3 + 4/ (N − 1) for ∀h ∈ H. Therefore, we only need to prove that F (q) is Lipschitz continuous 7 over Q, i.e., show that there exists a real constant c lip 1 > 0 such that, for all q, s ∈ Q,
According to the definition of Euclidean norm, (26) can be shown to hold if each element of the function F (q), denoted by f h n (q) = dB n (q) /dq h n , is Lipschitz continuous in q, i.e., for any n ∈ N and any h ∈ H, there exists a real constant c 
We now proceed to prove (27) holds. After some algebraic manipulation, we have
Substituting (28) into the left-hand side of (27), we have
